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THE DUTY TO BARGAIN OVER LAYOFFS IN
OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES: A VIEW
FROM AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
Athanassios Papaioannou*
The value in learning that others follow different premises to
different conclusions is not to prove that ours are wrong, but to
compel us to confront the question whether ours is right. . . . At
the very least, we are encouraged to think the unthinkable and to
consider the possibility of that which has been assumed
impossible.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the last decade, industrial relations in the United States
have been pressured and strained by the recession of the early eighties and strong foreign competition. It was in this decade that many
American employers reduced their workforce as a means to cut labor
costs and increase competitiveness. 2
Due to the rampant layoffs,3 American unions shifted their attention from bargaining on wage increases to bargaining for increased job security. Management, however, was often not willing to
discuss job security issues. They argued this was a business decision
and was part of the managerial prerogative.4 Furthermore, manage* Greek attorney; L.L.B. University of Athens, 1987; L.L.M. University of Pennsylvania,
1988. The author is currently a S.J.D. candidate and a research assistant at the University of
Pennsylvania. This article is a modified version of one chapter of his thesis.
1. Summers, American and European Labor Law: The Use and Usefulness of Foreign
Experience, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 210, 223 (1966-67) [hereinafter Summers, American and
European Labor Law].
2. Aaron, Plant Closings: American and Comparative Perspectives, 59 CHI.[-]KENT L.
REV. 941 (1983)(stating that "a sign of our current economic plight [is] that the problem of
plant closings, including partial shutdowns and relocations, is now high on the list of national
concerns.").
3. Id. at 941 (stating that during the first three months of 1982, 350,000 United States
workers lost their jobs either permanently or temporarily).
4. See Young, The Question of ManagerialPrerogatives, 16 INDUs. LAB. & REL REV.
240 (1963) (presenting management's approach to the issue and a very interesting critique of
its acceptance by the courts). Although Young's article was written more than two decades
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ment argued, and convinced the courts, that unions did not have the
right to strike and press for such negotiations since those issues were
considered to be outside the scope of the employer's duty to bargain.'
Unsurprisingly, much litigation arose out of these issues. Labor
disputes best resolved in the workplace or on a legislative level were
finally resolved in the courtrooms.' The courts, as well as the National Labor Relations Board, since 1983, did not prove to be very
friendly toward unions. In a series of decisions the courts significantly limited the duty to bargain and considerably undermined the
national policy favoring collective bargaining as a means of resolving
labor disputes, a policy that was expressed in the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 (hereinafter "N.L.R.A.").
The restrictive approach taken by American jurisprudence does
not provide adequate solutions to the increasing demands of a modern economy that requires more cooperative industrial relations, including increased dialogue and flow of information between labor
and management. Thus, the initiative has been left to the inventiveness and the good will of the parties.
In addition, American labor jurisprudence has been remarkably
out of touch with the developments in other Western countries.
There, major legislative reforms have been in place since the early
seventies when the first signs of economic crisis became apparent.
The reforms were aimed at broadening the dialogue between employers and employees over the crucial issue of job security.
This paper will examine the developments in other Western
countries and contrast them with the situation in the United States.'
ago, its validity remains intact.
5. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); cf. Summers, Worker Participationin Sweden and the United States: Some Comparisonsfrom an
American Perspective, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 175, 202 (1984)(stating that "in the United States

the duty to bargain and the right to strike are opposite sides of the same coin.") [hereinafter
Summers, Worker Participation].
6. See Klare, Judical Deradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1977-78) (illustrating the importance

of the courts in the interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935) [hereinafter
Klare, Judicial Deradicalization].
7. See Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance:
The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining,68 VA. L. REV. 1447 (1982); see also George, Collective
Bargaining in Chapter 11 and Beyond, 95 YALE LJ. 300, 336-46 (1985) (criticizing the Supreme Court's approach to collective bargaining as demonstrated in NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984) and First National Maintenance v. NLRB., 452 U.S. 666

(1981)).
8. Cf. Aaron, supra note 2, at 941; Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Characterof
American Labor Laws, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1394 (1971); Note, Duties to Employees Affected
by a Transfer of the Enterprise: United States, Europe and Japan, 9 COMP. LAB. L.J. 558
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This is not an attempt to suggest a lighthearted transplanting of foreign legal systems and institutions. Labor law is one area of law
where reforms based solely on foreign models would create many
problems. Labor law provisions do not exist in a vacuum. They take
their substance under the given political, economic and social relations of the country where they are enacted.9 Given the inherently
political nature of labor law, one cannot ignore the particular conditions of a given legal system and simply hope that its success in regulating labor relations in one country will be equally successful in
another.
However, one should not underestimate the importance of studying how other countries have dealt with the problem of bargaining
over layoffs. Among the major Western countries, the American sys-

tem gives the least influence to employees regarding decisions which
may deprive them of their jobs. In addition, the American system
does not encourage the broadening of the workers' role in the running of their companies. 10 Other countries have developed more elaborate and more comprehensive systems for protecting the interests of
both the workers and their companies."" These systems have not destroyed the capitalist system or eliminated the "free enterprise"
economy as several American employers and writers would have us
believe.1 2 Countries that have developed these industrial relations
systems, such as the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter
"F.R.G."), Sweden, and Japan, are noted for their economic stabil(1987) (authored by Jill R. Whitelow) [hereinafter Duties].
9. A characteristic example is the different development of industrial relations in Japan
and the United States, although the latter imposed its labor laws on Japan after the Second
World War. See W. GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW, XVII (1984)
(noting that "the lesson of a comparison of labor law in Japan and the United States is a
lesson in the limits of law itself.").
10. See NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (holding that white-collar
employees who had achieved extensive participatory rights through bargaining became managerial personnel, and thus lost their right to unionize and bargain with the management);
Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38
CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 54 (1988) (stating that "Yeshiva and its progeny reflect a deep-seated
distrust of democratic workplace organization.") [hereinafter Klare, Workplace Democracy];
see also Comment, Industrial Democracy and the Managerial Employee Exception to the
NationalLabor Relations Act, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 441 (1985) (authored by Albert G. Bixler).
11. See Summers, Comparative Perspectives, in LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE
141 (1988) (noting that in most other countries the employer "views the employee not as a
supplier of labor but as a member of the enterprise.") [hereinafter Summers, Comparative
Perspectives].
12. See, e.g., N. WOLFSON, THE MODERN CORPORATION: FREE MARKETS VERSUS REGULATION 80 (1984) (accusing those favoring employees' participation on the board of directors, that "[t]hey are after a bigger and different game: the transformation of the free market
corporate system into a socialist regime.").
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ity and social prosperity, as well as for the fact that their companies
are among the most competitive ones in the world."3
This paper does not argue that it was solely because of their
industrial relations that these countries achieved such a strong position in the world economy. However, it suffices that their labor law
systems have not prevented these countries from achieving their economic goals while offering better protection to their workers than the
U.S. offers.
Thus, by showing that no cataclysmic effects have been brought
to those countries by such labor legislation, this article hopes to support the idea that American labor law should broaden the employer's
duty to bargain so that it covers decisions that lead to the loss of
jobs. Opponents of such reforms may then be more inclined to discuss the problem in realistic rather than apocalyptic terms.
The first part of this article provides an overall description of
the different developments of the duty to bargain over layoffs in the
U.S. and in the other Western countries.1 4 The second part details
the various ways that other countries have promoted the right of
workers to participate in decisions that threaten their jobs. 15 The discussion will focus on the legal systems of the F.R.G., France, Japan,
Sweden and the United Kingdom (hereinafter "U.K."), although
references to other countries will be made. 16 This limitation is primarily dictated by the fact that these are the Western countries
whose legal systems of labor relations provide a wide variety of ways
to deal with the complex problem of bargaining over layoffs. In addition, comparing the industrial relations of these countries with those
of America's is more relevant due to the parity of economic
17
development.
Although the narrow scope of this comparison demands general
observations about the various countries rather than a detailed discussion of each legal system, every effort will be made to avoid misleading analogies and generalizations that underscore the differ13. See Litvin, Fearful Assymetry: Employee Free Choice and Employer Profitability
in First National Maintenance, 58 IND. L.J. 433, 496 (1983).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 24-83.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 84-193.
16. The author's familiarity with Greece's industrial relations accounts for some of the
particular references made to that country.
17. See Clarke, Industrial Relations in a Changing Economic Environment: The Postwar Experience of Advanced Market Economies, inCOMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 39 (R. Blanpain ed. 1985) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW] (providing a brief account of how the industrialized countries have dealt with their relations in the
economic crisis of the last two decades).
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ences.' 8
The third part of this article will briefly compare the individual
protections offered to workers in a variety of countries.19 This is not
the main concern of our study, but it is offered because knowledge of
the protections that individual workers enjoy by social legislation will
enable a better understanding of the balance of power between unions and employers during negotiations over layoff decisions.20
The article will conclude with a general assessment of the development of the duty to bargain in other Western countries,2" some
comments about the limits that reality imposes on the labor systems
of Western countries,22 and a rebuttal to some of the most common
misperceptions that exist in the U.S. about the industrial relations
systems of other countries.2 a
II. A

GENERAL OVERVIEW

Historically, the duty to bargain over layoffs was nonexistent. In
Sweden it was commonly accepted, especially since the so-called December Compromise between the unions and the employers in
1906,24 which determined that the employer had the right to "direct
and distribute the work, to hire and dismiss workers at will, and to
employ workers whether they are organized or not." 25
In France, collective bargaining traditionally takes place on an
industry level26 and, until recently, was only concerned with mone27
tary issues such as wages, paid vacations, etc.
In the F.R.G., collective bargaining traditionally took place on a
regional28 and industry level and never encompassed issues such as
job security. In fact, the works councils did not have, up until 1972,
18. This danger is of course inherent in any comparison of different legal systems. Cf.
Summers, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 11, at 139 (noting that "[c]omparisons in

labor law require sailing between the Scylla of generalization, which distorts with oversimplification, and the Charybdis of specifics which obscures with details.").
19.

See infra text accompanying notes 194-244.

20. See infra text accompanying notes 241-44 (examining a comparison with the U.S.
situation).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 246-56.
22.

See id.

23. See infra text accompanying notes 257-65.
24.

Summers, Worker Participation,supra note 5, at 184.

25. Id. at 185.
26. See Reynaud, France, in TOWARDS
1979) [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY].

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

58 (B. Roberts ed.

27. See Glendon, French Labor Reform 1982-1983: The Struggle for Collective Bargaining, 32 Am. J. ComP. L. 449, 470 (1984).

28. See
(1981).

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE, EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
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the extensive consultation and codetermination powers that they now
29
enjoy.
In the U.K., the laissez-faire approach is the cornerstone of its
industrial relations policies. 30 The duty to bargain never arose as a
main issue on the legislative level until the seventies.-1
In Japan, the concept of lifetime employmqnt and the belief
that labor disputes must always be discussed between the employer
and his workers has existed since the Second World War. However,
it was not until the seventies that the system was tested under the
strain of the multiple international economic crises that occurred in
industrial relations.3 2
Finally, the European Economic Community (hereinafter
"E.E.C."), which was conceived to play a major role in the implementation of labor policies by emphasizing the need for consultation
between the two parties, did not develop an elaborate policy on social
issues concerning industrial relations until 1974 when the "Social
Action Programme" was approved by the Council of Ministers of the
E.E.C. 33

The economic crisis of the seventies, which brought a prolonged
recession, was the chief catalyst of proworker policies. While major
industries faced acute problems in adjusting to the new economic
conditions and implementing "rationalization" programs, unions became increasingly concerned about the effects of recession upon their
members' jobs and thus shifted their focus from wages to job security, demanding increased bargaining and more protection against
34
these "rationalization" plans.
Meanwhile, in most European countries governments composed
29. See infra text accompanying notes 89-11.
30. See Gospel, Trade Unions and the Legal Obligation to Bargain: An American,
Swedish and British Comparison, 21 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 343, 349 (1983).
31. Summers, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 11, at 149.
32. Anthony, Japan, in MANAGING WORKFORCE REDUCTION, AN INTERNATIONAL SURvEy 125 (M. Cross ed. 1985)[hereinafter WORKFORCE REDUCTION].
33. Bellace, Employment Protection in the EEC, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 413, 425 (1985).
This article, will not deal with the E.E.C.'s collective dismissals provisions per se. However, this article will examine the particular path that each of the major common market
countries has chosen to follow partly in response to those provisons. See generally Schnorr,
European Communities, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW, supra note 17, at 113-31.
34. Cf Cordova, Collective Bargaining,in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW, supra note 17,
at 325.
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of Social-Democrats were in power a5 and the fight against unemploy-

ment became a top priority.3 Some countries tried to find solutions

by getting directly involved in the labor market and Sweden's Labor
Market Board"7 is a most characteristic example. Other countries,

such as the F.R.G., adopted comprehensive procedures which enabled the parties to find solutions to their common problems.3 8
Moreover, during the seventies union membership rose and unions reached the peak of their political and social power.3 9
However, the economic crisis of the seventies cannot alone ex-

plain the changes in the labor policies of Western countries. Another
major factor was the social unrest of the late sixties,40 which came
about, in part, as a result of the deep discontentment with the existing social systems and their lack of respect for the dreams and the
needs of the individual. 41 This social strife had important ramifications for Western labor relations. One major source of the people's
35. In the F.R.G. the Social-Democrats ruled from 1969 until 1982. In Sweden they
have been in power since the thirties and lost it only temporarily in 1976. In the U.K. the
Labour Party was in power from 1974 until 1979.
In France, although the socialists did not come into power until 1981, the center-wing
government which ruled France during the seventies was faithful to the populist ideology of De
Gaulle. Thus, it showed a sensitivity to issues of industrial relations unconnected with the
American concepts of market economy and laissez-faire labor policies of the eighties. Reynaud, France, in INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 55; see also France, in EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 28, at 180-99 (providing an account of the protective
legislation passed by conservative governments in France).
36. Martin, Displacement Policies in Europe and Canada, in DEINDUSTRIALIZATION
AND PLANT CLOSURE 240 (P. Standohar & H. Brown eds. 1987) [hereinafter DEINDUSTRIALIZATION].

37. See Hooks, Comparison of the United States, Sweden, and France,in DEINDUSTRIALIZATION, supra note 36, at 252-53.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 93-102 (discussing this in more detail).
39. In the U.K. for example, the late seventies saw the apogee of the unions' membership, accompanied by a militancy with hardly any precedent, in the post-war era. See Price,
Union Growth in Britain Retrospect and Prospect, 21 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 46, 46-47 (1983).
But the influence of unions in a given country is not measured by their membership. In
France for example, where the percentage of union membership has been traditionally low,
unions' position was favored by the protective policies followed by the governments of the
seventies. See supra note 35 (discussing France).
40. See generally THE RESURGENCE OF CLASS CONFLICT IN WESTERN EUROPE SINCE
1968 (C. Crouch & A. Pizzorno eds. 1978) [hereinafter CLASS CONFLICT]; WORKER MILLITANCY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 1965-75 (S. Barkin ed. 1975) [hereinafter WORKER
MILITANCY].

41. Cf. BARKIN. The Third PostwarDecade (1965-75): Progress,Activism and Tension,
in WORKER MILLITANCY, supra note 40, at 2 [hereinafter Barkin, The Third Postwar Decade] (saying that the people called "for fundamental changes in the structure of the capitalistic system to make it more consistent with the visions of employees and trade union movements."); Clarke, supra note 17, at 51 (saying that the uprising of the late sixties "tested an
existing social order, including sometimes the leadership of [the] trade unions.").
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discontent was the alienating nature of their jobs, which fostered resentment for the way that their workplaces were run. 42 The employees asked for more participation in decisions that affected their lives
and claimed property rights in their jobs. 4
Futhermore, union members were dissatisfied with the bureaucratic and alienating nature of their unions." This was evident in
40
45
Central and Northern Europe, especially in France and Sweden
where the unions had become highly centralized bureaucracies that
rarely heard the voices of their members.
Unions tried to respond to this internal challenge to their authority by pressing for the satisfaction of their members' demands.
Thus, in countries like Sweden, the F.R.G., and France, extensive
legislation was enacted bringing some degree of democracy and participation in the decisionmaking process of the companies.47
A clear tendency toward decentralization of industrial relations
appeared in France, 48 Sweden, 49 Italy (to a certain extent),50 and the

F.R.G.51The increased role of works councils is merely one aspect of
this decentralization trend.5 2 The trend satisfied the grassroots de42. See generally Kirchlechner, New Demands or the Demands of New Groups? Three
Case Studies, in CLASS CONFLICT, supra note 40, at 161-76.
43. See also Barkin, The Third PostwarDecade, supra note 41, at 2 (saying that the
people demanded "sweeping improvements in terms of employment, working conditions, and
worker and trade union rights in the economy and political life."); cf.Harrison, Closure Notification in Western Europe, in DEINDUSTRIALIZATION, supra note 36, at 229 (stating that
"[t]he idea that the workers should have a legally justifiable collective bargaining right to
'notify and consult' emerged in western Europe as a widespread political issue in the wake of
the mass labor unrest of the years 1968-69.").
44. Cf. A. CAREW, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNMENT IN EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONS 172
(1976) (discussing a "rank and file revolt").
45. The impressive increase in the membership of the socialist C.F.D.T. which emphasized grass-root politics and advocated the "auto-gestion" of the factories has a lot to do with
this public feeling. The same can be said about the decline in the force of the highly centralized, communist C.G.T.U.. See Raynaud, Elitist Society Inhibits Articulated Bargaining,in
WORKER MILITANCY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 279 (S. Barkin ed. 2nd ed. 1983) (providing
the two unions approaches).
46. See Summers, Worker Participation,supra note 5, at 214-16.
47. In the U.K. there was no similar movement and this may be attributed to the limited
effect that the social unrest of the late sixties had upon that country.
48. See Glendon, supra note 27; see also Eyraud & Tchobanian, The Auroux Reforms
and Company Level Industrial Relations in France, 23 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 241 (1985),
49. See Peterson, Swedish Collective Bargaining-A Changing Scene, 25 BRIT. J. INDUS.
REL 31 (1987).
50. See generally Treu & Negrelli, Workers' Participationand Personnel Management
Policies in Italy, 126 INT'L LAB. REV. 81 (1987).
51. Cf.Cordova, supra note 34, at 318-19 (noting a rise of enterprise-level agreements
in Italy, Sweden, Great Britain, Ireland and the F.R.G.).
52. See Barkin, Summary and Conclusion:Redisigning Collective Bargainingand Capitalism, in WORKER MILITANCY, supra note 40, at 384 [hereinafter Barkin, Summary and
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mand for more involvement in the running of the companies and the
unions. It was also adopted by employers who found centralized industrial relations an impediment to making the readjustments that
would meet the needs of the changing economic environment.5 3 More

decentralized bargaining and agreements meant more flexibility, and
this was precisely what the individual employer needed during a cri-

sis period. 4
The trend of decentralization and company-level agreements facilitated the increased requirements of consultation before workforce

reductions and other issues related to productivity could take place.",
Some aspects of these decisions are still negotiated on a more centralized level and some are even statutorily regulated, for example
severance payments and advance-notice periods.56 In addition, procedural matters, such as the manner of consultations, can also be regulated from the top.57 However, bargaining over managerial decisions
such as a merger, a closure, or reorganization which involves workforce reductions, must be discussed on the company level.58 This is
because the decision demands an accurate appreciation of the particConclusion] (stating that the works councils "grew out of the demand for workers representatives in the shop, employers' resistance to adversary relations with unions, and the desire of
governments for cooperative attitudes between the parties."(emphasis added)).
53. See Barkin, Summary and Conclusion, supra note 52, at 398-99; cf Clarke, supra
note 17, at 46 (stating that "[i]f enterprise bargaining is the predominant level, there are clear
advantages in respect of relating negotiations to productivity, profitability, and the conditions
of the local labour markets."). But see Eyraud & Tchobanian, supra note 48, at 244 (describing the fear of French employers that company-level negotiations may limit their managerial
prerogatives).
54. See Raynaud, supra note 45, at 284-85.
55. Cf Summers, Worker Participation,supra note 5, at 192.
[T]he most crucial factor explaining the decentralization of the American system is,
in my view, the breadth of subjects regulated by collective bargaining. Because collective agreements in the United States reach subjects that relate so directly to
working conditions, the production processes, the kind of work performed, and the
employees' rights at the workplace, negotiations on many of these matters must be
decentralized.
Id.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 218-27 (discussing advance notice periods).
57. An example was the national agreement reached in Sweden between employers and
unions in 1982 which imposed the procedures for the collective bargaining at the companylevel. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Summers, Worker Participation,supra note 5, at 194 (stating that in Sweden "[b]oth the unions and the employers seem to agree, at least in principle, that the functions of codetermination . . . must be performed by the local organization dealing directly
with the individual employer."); see also infra text accompanying notes 130-42 (discussing-the
duty to bargain over layoffs in Britian); infra text accompanying notes 92-102 (discussing the
F.R.G. where the bargaining over these issues takes place between the employer and his works
council).
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ular financial situation of the company.59 Thus, the decentralization
of collective labor relations by new legal provisions and labor institutions has overcome the long established customs and attitudes of employers, unions and governments, and has broadened the workers'
role in decisions affecting the very existence of their jobs.6"
Based on the European experience, as described herein, it is
easy to assume that the same two factors would lead to a need for
workers and their representatives in the United States to play a bigger part in layoff decisions. The first factor is the prolonged recession
that continued until the early eighties and shifted the unions' focus
from wages to the preservation of their members' jobs."' The second
factor is the decentralized nature of the collective bargaining process, that provides the appropriate structure for bargaining over jobsecurity issues. 62However, there are a number of political, social and
ideological factors that have determined the direction that American
industrial relations have taken from those of the major Western
countries as previously discussed.
The main political reason for this difference is that labor did not
have the strong support of any political party. Consequently, the necessary legislative reforms, which would protect the interests of the
workers as a class, were not initiated.6" An active policy on the part
of Congress to promote the workers' interests and encourage unionism has been absent since the Roosevelt era. 4 In the last two decades, despite the increasing social and economic problems that
59.

See Summers, Worker Participation,supra note 5, at 192.

60. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text; cf. J.CRISPo, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE 16 (1970) (arguing that "because collective bargaining in Western
Europe has tended to be more national or regional in character, other mechanisms were bound
to emerge to serve the more parochial company and plant level concerns of workers."). But see
Lawrence, Union Responses to Plant Closures, in DEINDUSTRIALIZATION, supra note 36, at

211 (arguing that plant-bargaining, as is usually the level of bargaining in the U.S., over
investment decisions is not effective, in contrast to company-level bargaining).
61. See Collective Bargainingand Labor Management Relations, 1988, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 22, at D-1 (Feb. 3, 1989).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 48-56. But see Lawrence, supra note 60, at 211.
63. See Hooks, supra note 37, at 247 (stating that "[s]ocial welfare reformers have

lacked the support of either a powerful aristocracy or a socialist movement.. . . As a consequence, they have met with only partial successes and many failures."); see also Galenson,

The Historical Role of American Trade Unionism, in UNIONS INTRANSITION 65 (S.Lipset
ed. 1986) (noting that the unions' links with the Democratic Party have nothing to do with the
links of their European counterparts with their countries' political parties).
64. See Summers, ComparativePerspectives, supra note 11, at 142 (finding a shift from
the'1930s public policy of encouraging collective bargaining and unionization to a post-war
"legal neutrality or indifference"); see also Edelman, New Deal Sensitivity to Labor Interests,
in LABOR AND THE NEW DEAL 180-81 (M. Derber & E. Young eds. 1957) (noting President
Roosevelt's stance on the issue was rather ambiguous).
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American labor faces, there has been no major piece of legislation
that would promote the interests of labor as a social group. 5 And
while at one end the unions had no sucess making legislative advances, at the other end they lost all judicial battles as they could
not persuade the judges to expand the scope of the duty to bargain . 6
Thus, unions have no political tools to advance their cause and their
67
only weapon, economic action, was rendered impotent by recession.
On a social and ideological level, the situation for unions and
workers is by no means better. Union membership had fallen below
20% of the nonagricultural labor force,68 and society has shown,
since the end of the war, a persistent hostility towards organized labor.6 9Unions are considered corrupt, bureaucratic and nonrepresentative of their members' interests, 0 while their claims for bargaining
are viewed as an impediment to the efficient functioning of companies.7 1 By contrast, businessmen are esteemed and admired by society and their opinions are given great deference by the media, politicians and the people. 2
Lastly, the predominance of classical economics in academia,
65. The phrase "interests as a social group" is used to distinguish them from the interests of the individual workers. Regarding the latter, there were some very important acts such
as E.R.I.S.A. and O.S.H.A.. The existence of these laws might suggest that it is not so much a
lack of sensitivity towards the worker that leads the Legislature and the Administration but
rather the fear against the promotion of the collective power of labor as against the employers.
66. See Raday, Individual and Collective Dismissal-A Job Protection Dichotomy, 10
Comp. LAB. L.J. 121, 132 (1989) (finding that "the philosophy articulated throughout the
judicial system remains one of deference to an unrestricted entrepreneurial freedom to make
collective terminations for the purpose of closing down a business or making changes in its
character or direction.").

67. See M.

GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR

43 (1987).

68. See Union Membership Declines to 16.8% of Workers in 1988, BIS Survey Shows,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at B-13 (Jan. 30, 1989).

69. See D.

BOK

& J.

DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY

17-18 (1970)

(discussing the popularity of the union movement in the U.S.); see also GOLDFIELD, supra
note 67, at 36.
70. This belief is certainly unfair to most of the American unions as they are more
democratic in their internal organization and much closer to the wishes of their members than
the German or the Swedish unions. See Summers, Worker Participationin the U.S. and West
Germany: A Comparative Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. Comp. L. 367, 38591 (1980) [hereinafter Summers, A Comparative Study] (regarding unions in the F.R.G.);
Summers, Worker Participation,supra note 5, at 214-21 (regarding unions in Sweden).
71. Cf. Duties, supra note 8, at 564 (stating that "[t]he American public. . . perceives
managerial rights to be more important and, hence, gives less legitimacy to workers' interests
in bargaining over these 'entrepreneurial' decisions.").

72. See N.

CHAMBERLAIN, THE UNION CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT CONTROL

57

(1967) (stating that "in no other country has the opinion of the successful businessman been so
respected by the churches, followed by the small businessmen, supported by the press, ac... ).
corded deference by the politicians, and even accepted by many of the workers.
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coupled with the frequent use of the vague notion of efficiency versus
fairness, has raised questions regarding the utility of unions as social
institutions. 3 Theoretical issues that were solved long ago in other
Western countries reappear now in the United States, questioning
the very need for the existence of unions. 4
Consequently, American unions have not been able to become
powerful political institutions that could serve as the voice of protest
for the working people. 75 The movement of the sixties took place
without the support or the participation of most American unions,
and actually occurred in spite of the opposition of several unions that
supported the Vietnam war. 6 Because American unions have been a
very conservative social force (at least when compared with their
counterparts in other western countries) they have been unable to
build the powerful social alliances that would enable them to promote their aims." Thus lacking any stable and influential political
78
allies, they lost the battle.
Finally, it is often emphasized that a major role was played by
the adversarial attitude of unions towards employers in the U.S. and
their reluctance to support forms of industrial democracy. 79 These
attitudes may account for a lack of progress in the implementation
of institutional forms of worker participation (such as participation
on the boards of directors or works councils) 8O° It is irrelevant as to
73. For anyone accustomed to other western countries' perceptions of unions, it is surprising to see highly esteemed academics in the U.S. arguing that the main function of unions
is to facilitate the cartelization of the labor market. See, e.g., Posner, Some Economics of

Labor Law, 51 . U. CHI. L. REv. 988, 990 (1984). The important social and political functions
that unions fulfill in a modern society, when they are free to successfully operate, are undermined or ignored.

74. See, e.g., Epstein, A Common Law for LaborRelations: A Critiqueof the New Deal
Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1394-98 (1983) (criticizing governmental intervention
to encourage collective bargaining).

75. Cf. Clarke, supra note 17, at 43 (stating that "[v]irtually from the beginning of the
post-1973 era, the trade unions found themselves the major force, internationally, in expressing
disagreement, even alarm, at the policies on which governments were embarking.").
76.

Rosen, The United States: A Time for Reassessment, in WORKER MILITANCY supra

note 40, at 342-43.
77. See id.
78. See M. GOLDFIELD, supra note 67, at 11 (noting that the American unions are the
only ones in the Western world with a steady decline since the 1950s).
79. See, e.g., Duties, supra note 8, at 565.

80. This is why those forms of participation have basically prospered in countries like
the F.R.G. where labor relations are rather consensual. Cf. J. CRISPO, supra note 60, at 112
(noting that the language used by the German statute for the works councils "is hardly the
language of collective bargaining and industrial relations in the normally accepted interpreta-

tion of those terms, [r]ather it is directed towards more consensual, constructive and harmonious relations between employers and employees.").
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noninstitutional forms of participation (such as collective bargaining), which in fact are based on the hypothesis of adversarial relations."' Consequently, American unions have always attempted to
bargain with employers over a wide variety of issues.82 Due to the
hostility of employers, however, these efforts have been largely unsuccessful, making each success, like that of the auto-industry,
(where management found it beneficial to bargain with the powerful
U.A.W. and grant some forms of job security to its employees),
noteworthy. 3
III.

THE MEANS CHOSEN TO INVOLVE LABOR IN LAYOFF

DECISIONS

There are basically three ways in that industrialized countries
have enabled labor to participate in decisions affecting job security:
(1) the establishment of works councils with consultation 4 and/or
codetermination rights; 5 (2) the broadening of the duty to bargain
or consult with the unions regarding such decisions;86 and (3) the
establishment of labor representation in the boards of directors or
the supervisory boards of companies.87 Most industrialized countries,
with the major exceptions of the U.S. and the U.K., have chosen a
combination of at least two of the aforementioned means of labor
participation. 8 Each of these means demand separate examination.
A.

Works Councils

Many countries have opted to create the institution of works councils. These may be defined as a committee of workers, elected by the
entire workforce of a particular company or plant, that is authorized
to receive information and be consulted by the employer on a whole
81. See Note, Employee Codetermination Origins in Germany, Present Practicein Europe, and Applicability to the U.S., 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 947, 988 (1977) (authored by J.
Bautz Bonanno) (stating that "[w]hile bargaining is undoubtedly itself a form of codetermina-

tion, it is a form which is reactive and adversarial rather than participatory and cooperative.").
82. See Summers, Worker Participation,supra note 5, at 187 (saying that American
unions have never conceded to the employees the prerogatives that their Swedish counterparts
did until the seventies).
83. Cf. Comment, The Saturnizationof American Plants:Infringement or Expansion of
Workers' Rights, 72 MINN. L. Rav. 173 (1987) (authored by Lori M. Beranek). But see
Bieber Urges Caution in Responding to Worker ParticipationSchemes, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 31, at A-3 (Feb. 16, 1989).
84. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 112-57 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 158-93 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 130-45 and accompanying text (discussing systems of labor participation in the U.S. and U.K.).
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range of issues.
This institution of labor participation in the company's affairs
dates back, to the early twenties when the Weimar Constitution of
Germany provided for its creation.89 This was due, in part, to an
effort by the state and the unions to integrate the working class,
which had just been involved in a bloody revolution after the Great
War. In the same decade, works councils were established in Austria, Denmark, Norway and Czechoslovakia." Abolished by the
Nazi regime, the works councils were reestablished in the F.R.G.
after World War II by the workers themselves, and were encouraged
by the Occupation Forces, particularly the U.K.9 1 Subsequently,
works councils have evolved into what has been rightfully called the
"center-piece, or the backbone of workers' participation in the Fed' For our purposes however, the most
eral Republic of Germany." 92
important developmemt was the 1972 legislative reform implemented
by the social-democratic government of Willy Brandt in the
F.R.G.,9" which substantially broadened the powers of the councils.
German works councils, established in companies with at least
five employees, must be informed and consulted when management
considers massive layoffs, or when an employer contemplates decisions that "entail substantial prejudice to the staff or a large sector
thereof."94 The employer must "consult over the decision itself," to
use the American terminology.9" Such decisions involving plant closures, mergers, relocations, reorganization and "rationalization measures," for example, are the kinds of decisions that American jurisprudence under the N.L.R.A., and to a certain degree under the
Railway Labor Act (hereinafter "R.L.A."), have found to belong to
the sacrosanct area of the employers' exclusive discretion.9"
89.
90.

W. KOLVENBACH, EMPLOYEE COUNCILS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIES 110 (1978).
T. DEVos, U.S. MULTINATIONALS AND WORKER PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 134 (1981).
91. Id. at 135-36.
92. Schregle, Workers' Participationin the FederalRepublic of Germany in an International Perspective, 126 INT'L LAB. REV. 317, 319 (1987).
93. Works Constitution Act of January 15, 1972. (Eng. translation 1972 Int'l Lab. Off.
(Ser. Ger. F. 1)).
94. This negative effect must involve at least 20 percent of the workforce. See Summers,
Comparative Perspectives,supra note 11, at 147-48. For dismissals of a lesser scope, certain
less strict consultation and codetermination procedures are also provided for. Id.

95. See also id. at 148.
96. The Supreme Court has on several ocasions ruled that "managerial decisions, which
lie at the core of entrepreneurial control," are not mandatory subjects of bargaining.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 204, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); see
also Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. RLEA, 109 S.Ct. 2584 (1989) (holding that an employer

who decides to sell a business does not have a duty to bargain); First Nat'l Maintenance v.
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As far as the effects of these decisions are concerned, the works
councils have codetermination rights. In these cases, the employer
must present to the works council a proposal that will mitigate the
effects of the decision upon the employees.9 7 If the two parties cannot reach an agreement, the dispute is submitted to the binding authority of a tripartite Arbitration Commission,98 which formulates a
so-called "social plan" to provide for the compensation of the laidoff workers, retraining programs, etc. 9
Thus, the management prerogative is retained where the decision itself is concerned, although, unlike N.L.R.A. caselaw, there is
a consultation duty. However, the effects of this decision are not part
of the prerogative, and the employer has to abide by the rulings of
the arbitration committee. This sharing of authority over the effects
of the decision ultimately affects the employer's authority over the
decision itself. As one commentator said, "the prospect of the works
council insisting on a costly social plan causes employers to work out
an agreement with the works council as to the changes to be made so
as to minimize the impact on the workforce or avoid a social plan
entirely." 100 In light of this remark, the inability of the works councils to call a strike01 ' does not prevent the councils from affecting the
decision of the employer. 02
In addition to the F.R.G, other countries have adopted similar
provisions, even though their works councils have fewer powers. In
France, for example, the so-called "shop committees" have consultation rights. There, the works councils are required to be established
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (ruling that a partial closure of a business does not create a duty
of the employer to bargain).
97.

Summers, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 11, at 148.

98. Weiss, The Role of Neutrals in the Resolution of Interest Disputes in the Federal
Republic of Germany, 10 Comp. LAB. L.J. 339, 351 (1989) [hereinafter Weiss, The Rule of

Neutrals in Germany].
99. Bosch, West Germany, in

WORKFORCE REDUCTION,

supra note 32, at 179.

100. Summers, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 11, at 148. In order to have a
more complete picture of the power of the works councils in these consultations, one must also

consider their broad information rights about which we will talk later. See infra text accompanying notes 197-212.
101. Neal, Co-determination in the Federal Republic of Germany: An External Perspective from the United Kingdom, 25 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 227, 239 (1987).
102. See Weiss, Industrial Employment Rights: Focusing on Job Security in the Federal Republic of Germany, 67 NEB. L. REv.82, 97 (1988) [hereinafter Weiss, IndustrialEmployment Rights] (stating that "[t]he mere possibility of the works councils involvement in

many cases may lead the employer to exclude dismissal as an instrument of personnel policy;
without facing such difficulties [i.e. negotiations with the council and binding arbitration],
dismissal would be used.").
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in all companies with fifty or more employees. 10 3 The law, passed in
October 1982 by the socialist government of Mitterand, substantially
expanded the issues on which the employer must consult the shop
committees before making a decision.104 Thus, the committee must
be consulted about decisions affecting the size and the structure of
the workforce, layoffs and even decisions such as major investments,
acquisitions, or sales of branches, mergers, etc. 0 5 Unlike the German works councils, no codetermination rights are given to the
French commit.108 Nevertheless, the opportunity that the workers
have, as a matter of law, to influence the decisions
that affect their
07
jobs is much greater than it is in the U.S.
Many other European countries including Denmark, the
Netherlands, and Belgium, have also established the institution of
the works councils.' 08 In general, the authority of the works councils
has been significantly expanded in all Western European countries in
the past two decades.' 0 9 The works councils seem to be the best accommodation of the workers' desire to have more impact on job security issues on the one hand, and the employers' traditional resentment towards any interference by the unions on the other. 110
Employers generally look upon works councils as part of their corporations, whereas unions are considered outsiders."'
B. The Duty to Bargain or to Consult
Other countries, such as Sweden and the U.K. have chosen another
path to protect the workers' right to influence layoff decisions by es103.

Glendon, supra note 27, at 463.

104.

Id.

105. Id.
106. Id. at 465.
107. Compare the French provisions with the American judicial approach. See, e.g.,
supra note 96 and accompanying text (providing an example).
108. See Waschke, Workers' Participationin Management in the Nine European Community Countries, 2 COMP. LAB. L.J. 83, 83-91 (1977).
A similar labor institution, established in practice but not by law, is the Japanese joint

consultative committees. See Okamoto, Japan, in

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY,

supra note 26, at

201-05 (characterizing them as the "most significant institutional arrangement for worker participation . . . operating in Japan.").
109. See, e.g., Austria, Changes to the Works ConstitutionAct, 152 EUR. INDUS. REL.
REv. 28 (Sept. 1986).

Even in countries with no previous experience with this institution, some pieces of legislation have recently been introduced. See, e.g., Greece, ILO Convention 135 Ratified, 156 EUR.
INDUs. REL REv. 5 (Jan. 1987).
110. Cf T. DEVos, supra note 90, at 168 (stating that "[iun firms whose workers are not
unionized, works councils and higher pay can help prevent workers from becoming unionized
and union leaders from directly influencing company policy.").
111. Id.
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tablishing the duty of the employer to bargain or consult with his
company's union before making such decisions.112 These were mainly
countries with no strong tradition of works councils, like Sweden, br
where the traditional hostility between employers and organized labor did not leave much chance for the success of the institutional
and cooperative form of worker participation embodied in the works
11 3
councils.
The best example is Sweden. As previously stated, 114 until the
seventies, the management prerogative to control the reduction of
the company's workforce was well established by national collective
agreements. 115 However, in the social turmoil of the late sixties and
the economic instability of the seventies, the unions, and particularly
L.O., pressed the friendly government of the Social-Democrats to
pass legislation that would require employers to bargain over issues
of job security." 6 The Codetermination Act of 1976, passed with the
consensus of public opinion, over the opposition of the right wing
parties, and despite the fierce reactions of the employers' association
(hereinafter "S.A.F.") is probably the most advanced piece of legislation in Europe concerning the employer's duty to bargain with
11 7
unions.
The duty to bargain over layoffs can be found in two sections of
the Swedish statute. Section 10 states that the union has the right to
negotiate with the employer "on any matter relating to the relationship between the employer and any member of the organization who
has been employed by that employer.""' 8 In section 11 the Act further establishes a duty of the employer to negotiate, on his own
initiative, any "important alteration to his activity" or any "important alteration of work or employment conditions for employees who
112. See infra notes 118-37 and accompanying text.
113. See Comment, The European Community's Draft Fifth Directive: British Resistance and Community Procedures, 10 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 429, 449 (1989)[hereinafter Resis-

tance] (stating that, in the U.K., "[tihe ingrained adversarial relationship between unions and
management will not support a system that requires cooperation, mental flexibility and attempts to listen to each other.").
114. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
115. This aspect of the managerial prerogative had been upheld by the Swedish courts.
See Elvander, Sweden, in INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 146.
116. Gospel, supra note 30, at 346.
117. Cf. Fahlbeck, The Role Of Neutrals in the Resolution of Industrial Disputes in
Sweden, 10 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 391, 397 (1989) [hereinafter Fahlbeck, The Role of Neutrals in
Sweden] (stating that "the broad scope of the duty to bargain leaves virtually nothing outside
the area of collective bargaining.").
118. See I.L.O. LEGISLATIVE SERIES (1976) Swe. 1. (providing an English translation of
the law).
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belong to the organization."' 19 So as to leave no doubt regarding the
scope of the duty to bargain, the introductory text of the bill stipulates that "[t]he Act shall be interpreted as an expression of the
opinion that it is no longer the employer alone who can make decisions, but that decision making shall be divided between employer
and employee through negotiation and agreement." 120 Coupled with
a liberal interpretation of the Act by the Swedish courts, 121 the new
law leaves no room for the employer to claim any prerogative to exclude collective bargaining over workforce reductions. In Sweden as
in other countries, the ultimate authority to make these decisions
12
still rests with the employer, 122 but in Sweden, few strikes result. 3
The strike activity that Sweden has experienced in the eighties 124 has
for the most part been concerned with wage increase issues on a national level, 125 and does not seem to have affected job security bargaining at the company level. This is impressive because the issue of
layoff bargaining is not easily handled, as demonstrated by the fact
that national negotiations over the procedural details of layoff bargaining took several years before being successfully concluded in
1982.126 Before concluding the discussion of Swedish law, two addi-

tional points demonstrating its overall philosophy should be mentioned. First, the unions have veto power over a decision of the employer to subcontract. 27 Second, and probably most important, is the
119.
120.

I.L.O. LEGISLATIVE SERIES (1976) Swe. 1, at § 11.
EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 28, at 49 (emphasis added).

121.

See Summers, Worker Participation,supra note 5, at 199 (citing several such

decisions).
122. Summers, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 11, at 146.

123. Summers, Worker Participation, supra note 5, at 212 (stating that "[t]he
codetermination system as it is now being developed seems to contemplate that the unions'
economic strength will not be used to influence the employers' decisions. . . .The effectiveness
of the employee's participation will be limited to the employer's willingness to listen and be
persuaded.").
124. See Peterson, supra note 49, at 36-37.

125. Where labor relations are centralized, as in Sweden, (if despite the aforementioned
recent trends, see supra text accompanying note 49) and industrial conflict escalates to a
multi-company level, bargaining over layoffs on a company-level is rather unlikely to end up in

a strike. See Summers, Worker Participation,supra note 5, at 190. Unless absolutely necessary, no party risks a major confrontation over a dispute in one individual company. Id.
Closely related to this lack of strikes on a company-level is the preference of Swedish unions
for political rather than economic action. See Summers, The Usefulness of Unions in a Major
Industrial Society- A Comparative Sketch, 58 TUL L. REV. 1409, 1427 (1984) [hereinafter
Summers, The Usefulness of Unions].
126. See Summers, Worker Participation,supra note 5, at 210; see also Sweden, in
EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 28, at 51.
127. Gospel, supra note 30, at 347; cf. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379

U.S. 204 (1964) (ruling that bargaining over subcontracting is required, but no veto power is
given to the union).
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provision of the law that gives the unions a priority of interpretation

of their collective agreement. 2 ' In other words, if a union argues

that an employer's decision is violating an agreement that he made
under the codetermination law, the employer may not implement his

decision until the issue is adjudicated.129
The United Kingdom is another country whose laws require
bargaining over layoffs. Generally, in the U.K., both parties (espe-

cially the unions) have resisted any regulation of industrial relations
imposed by Parliament.3 0 However, the Employment Protection Act

of 1975 was passed as part of the Social Contract made between the
Labour Government and the unions to avoid inflationary wage increases. 131 The law established the duty of the employer to consult
with the recognized union over redundancies at the earliest
opportunity."' 132
The employer also has to consult with the recognized union
when he contemplates transferring the ownership of his company. In
compliance with the relevant E.E.C. directive, the Thatcher government (with some delay and an apparent reluctance) issued the

Transfer of Undertakings Regulations in 1981.1 1 According to the
Regulations, which apply only to the transfer of ownership of a company as an ongoing concern, 3 4 the employer must inform the recog-

nized union about the decision to transfer the enterprise and consult
with the union about the effects that the transaction will have upon

the employees.' 35 The Regulation, like the E.E.C. directive, says that
the existing employment contracts, which play an important role in
England, are automatically assumed by the new employer.' 36 Fi128. See Fahlbeck, The Swedish Act on Joint Regulation of Working Life, in LAW
AND THE WEAKER PARTY 159 (A. Neal ed. 1981) [hereinafter Fahlbeck, The Swedish Act].
129. Id. at 161 (explaining the reasoning of the provison as "[t]he legislative intention is
not to encourage the established union continually to use its priority of interpretation, [o]n the
contrary, the power is considered as a means to exert pressure on the employer in order to
induce him to come to amicable solutions for differences over interpretation.").
130. Resistance, supra note 113, at 443-44.
131. J. CRISPO, supra note 60, at 58.
132. If an employer is going to dismiss at least 100 or more employees, it must consult
with the union at least 90 days in advance of the first dismissal; if the number of the employees to be dismissed is 10 or more then the required minimum advance-notice period is 30 days.

See

LORD WEDDERBURN, THE WORKER AND THE LAW

133.
134.

295 (1986).

Duties, supra note 8, at 576.
Id. at 576-77.

135. See

LORD WEDDERBURN,

supra note 132, at 300 (emphasizing that the decision is

considered fact).
136. Cf. Duties, supra note 8, at 577 (citing § 8(1) of the Transfer of Undertakings
Regulations 1981). The collective bargaining agreement situation is different from that of the
European directive where it is explicitly stated that the agreements continue to exist after the
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nally, in conformity with the E.E.C. directive, the regulation provides that no dismissal will take place as a result of the transfer
itself, but does allow dismissals for an "economic, technical
or orga137
nizational reason entailing changes in the workforce.'
Generally speaking, the consultation requirements under British
law are weak compared to those of other Western countries and are
further weakened by the fact that the employer is bound to bargain
only with a "recognized union," (a union with which he has already
signed a contract). 138 Moreover, the courts, faithful to their antiunion tradition, have on several occasions interpreted these provisions
narrowly.139 Thus, like any legislation regulating collective bargaining, the consultation
legislation had a limited effect upon British in4
dustrial relations. 0
In the case of redundancies, however, British law offers worker's
more protection than American law. In Britain, the trade unions are
permitted to strike if the employer refuses to bargain over such issues. 41 This weapon is not always effective in the case of redundancies, but it offers more protection than American labor law, which
forbids the unions to strike over nonmandatory issues of
4
bargaining.1 1
Generally, under the influence of the directives on collective redundancies and the transfer of undertakings, and under the pressure
of trade unions and public opinion, all Western European countries
have more or less provided substantial consultation rights to the unions or the works councils with respect to proposed work force reductransaction. Id. at 573. Under British labor law, collective agreements are not legally binding.
Cf.Wood, The Role of Neutrals in the Resolution of Interest Disputes in the United Kingdom, 10 ComP. LAB. L.J. 411, 412 (1989) (citing the "unwillingness of both sides of industry
to create legally bindingcollective agreements" and saying that "[a]s problems arise, they are
immediately made the subject of negotiations, unfettered by previous binding agreements.").
(emphasis added).
137. Duties, supra note 8, at 577.

138. See LORD WEDDERBURN, supra note 132, at 298 (mentioning the I.L.O.'s position
is, in interpreting its guidelines on multinationals, that where no union is recognized by the
employer, the latter should consult with the workers' representatives); see also Docksey, Information and Consultation of Employees: The United Kingdom and the Vredeling Directive, 49

MOD. L. REv. 281, 307 (1986) (suggesting that Britain should adopt the Greek system of
consultation, whereby, if no union exists in a company the employer must consult with the
workers' representatives who are elected by them ad hoc for the purposes of the particular
consultation).
139.
140.

tion.

. .

141.

See Duties, supra note 8,at 577.
Cf.Gospel, supra note 30, at 351 (stating that "legislation in the area of recogni-

has had only limited impact on the collective bargaining system in Britain.").
Summers, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 11, at 149.

142. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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tions.143 In comparison, American law, as interpreted in First National Maintenance, maintains that job security bargaining involves
only the effects of an employer's decision, yet it is still not clear
when the effects bargaining must begin in order to be effective. 4
The situation worsens when the dispute decision is a merger that,
according to caselaw, nullifies the previous collective bargaining
agreement and places the union representing the merged company's
work force under the threat of decertification. 45
Finally, the Japanese system also differs from the American system regarding the matter of bargaining over layoffs. Although, as
previously mentioned,146 the basis of Japanese labor law is the
N.R.L.A., the collective bargaining practice is quite different. 4
Aided by the decentralized structure of Japanese industrial relations,
the Japanese employer consults and bargains with the union on any
change in the conduct of his business that might lead to workforce
reductions. 48 Unlike the American system, no distinction is made
between mandatory and permissive subjects for bargaining and "in
fact almost all the issues over which the employer has any control
are regarded as coming within the scope of bargaining." 14 Thus,
consultation with unions or joint consultative committees, or works
councils, previously mentioned, 50 extend to issues that are outside
the scope of the duty to bargain under the N.L.R.A., issues such as
sales and investment policies.' 5'
'Arbitration is not considered an efficient alternative to collective
bargaining in Japan, as it is inconsistent with the desire to find coop143.

Cf. Note, Protecting Workers Faced with Job Loss Due to New Technology: The

E.E.C. Approach, 8 Comp.LAB. L.J. 183, 188-90 (1987) (authored by Leslie Allan Lugo).
144. See Kohler, Distinctions Without Differences: Effects BargainingIn Light of First
National Maintenance, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 402 (1983).
145. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); see also Howard John-

son Co. v. Detroit Local, Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974); Silver, Reflections on the Obligations of a Successor Employer, 2

CARDOZO

L. REV.545 (1981); Comment,

Successorship under Howard Johnson: Short Order Justicefor Employees, 64

CALIF.

L. REv.

795 (1976) (authored by James Severson & Michael Willcoxon) [hereinafter Successorship].

146. See supra note 9 (discussing this).
147.

Summers, ComparativePerspectives,supra note 11, at 151 (stating that "[t]he law

has little relevance to the bargaining process, for employers accept the principle of joint decision making with the enterprise union.").
148. See Hanami, Japan, in WORKFORCE REDUCTIONS IN UNDERTAKINGS 174 (E.
Yemin ed. 1982) [hereinafter UNDERTAKINGS].
149.

T.

HANAMI, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN

121, 122 (1985)

(also saying that "in enterprises where union-management relations are more mature, they
[the two parties] will agree to avoid unnecessary and useless confrontation; [sic] settling the

matter instead by mutual understanding in the form of consultation.").
150. See supra text accompanying notes 89-111.
151. W. GOULD, supra note 9, at 12-13.
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erative solutions rather than confrontational settlements.5 2 Litigation is very infrequent in the case of labor disputes5 3 since it is commonly accepted that the courts are not the appropriate forum to
solve "internal" problems. 5 4 Instead, solutions to these issues are arrived at by a commonly accepted practice, not imposed upon the parties by law.' 55 This practice reflects the tendency of the Japanese
employers not to choose workforce reductions unless they are absolutely necessary. As one commentator said, "Japanese firms have
evolved a system of graded steps for reducing

. . .

workers in all but

the most stringent of circumstances.' 56 The same commentator has
observed that "[o]ne is left with the impression that so far, the problem [of dealing with workforce reductions] has been well managed
1 57
by internal standards."'
C. Labor Representation on Corporate Boards
The introduction of worker representation on corporate boards,
be they boards of directors or supervisory boards, allows workers to
influence management decisions, including but not limited to decisions regarding layoffs.
This system, unlike other means of workers' participation in
managerial decisions, has not expanded much in the Western world.
This is due not only to the employers' resistance to such reforms,"'
but also to unions fears, in most countries (with the notable exception of the F.R.G.), that board participation will give them too little
power by integrating the labor movement into the capitalist system
in such a way as to cause the workers to identify with the company
rather than with their own class.' 59 This also explains the resistance
152.

Id. at 12.

153.

Id. at 99.

154.

Id. at 12.

1-55. See supra note 147 (noting the distinction between U.S. and Japanese Labor
Practices).
156. Anthony, supra note 32, at 125.
157.

Id.

158. Employers tend to react to such reforms even in countries with high cooperational
attitudes between the two parties. It is not a coincidence that the most extensive form of
participation on the corporate boards, covering the steel and coal industries in the F.R.G., was
introduced in the early post-war period. At that time, the German employers had lost much of
their social and political power due to their cooperation with and active support of the Nazi
regime. Since they lacked the necessary social and political strength to effectively resist any
infringement upon their managerial powers, German unions were able to overcome their resistance, as well as the reluctance of the Christian-Democrats who were then in power, and have

this law enacted. Cf. Hetzler & Schienstock, Federal Republic of Germany, in INDUSTRIAL
DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 58.
159. See, e.g., Resistance, supra note 113, at 448 ( stating that the British unions are
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of the highly politicized unions of France, Italy, and to a great extent, the U.K., 160 towards labor representation on corporate boards.
Even the Swedish unions, which actively and successfully pressed for
the passage of a statute establishing labor's participation on the
boards of directors, do not see it as a means of achieving actual

codetermination of the company's affairs; rather they perceive it as
the way to secure all of the necessary information about the com-

161
pany so as to successfully conduct collective bargaining.
Today, this institution has been implemented only in the E.E.C.
countries of Denmark, Luxembourg and the F.R.G. 62 and in the
Western countries of Sweden and Austria.
There are two ways of involving labor in corporate boards and
each country's choice is based on its system of corporate administration. One way, which is applied in the F.R.G, involves the participation of workers in supervisory boards that are separated from the
boards of directors. 6 The other way, which is simpler and technically easier to apply in the United States, involves the participation

"traditionally suspicious of board level worker representation as a system prone to 'ensnaring
workers' representatives within the enterprise .... '" (quoting LORD WEDDERBURN, THE
WORKER AND THE LAW 66 (1986)); see also Waschke, supra note 108, at 93 (saying in regard to the French unions that "[w]ith their ideological attachment to the principle of confrontation between unions and management they reject any idea of co-determination or co-operation with the capitalistic system.").
160. The Bullock Report of the mid-seventies suggested the introduction of labor representation in the corporate boards and had the support of the Labour Party which was then in
government. The report was buried under the turmoil of the 1979 strikes and the coming into
power of the conservatives. This concept of institutionalized participation in the company's
affairs never found warm support among organized labor in the U.K.. See J. ELIOTT, CONFLICT OR COOPERATION? THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 221-63 (1978) (providing an analytical account of the Bullock Report and the intial reactions to it).
161. See J. CRISPO, supra note 60, at 49, 97.
162. Waschke, supra note 108, at 91-100.
In the Netherlands, a unique system of participation exists in which the workers, while
not directly represented in the boards, may veto the appointments made by the shareholders or
the management to the supervisory boards through their works councils. See Albeda, The
Netherlands, in INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 119-22.
In Greece, the socialist government elected in 1981 attempted to introduce worker representation on supervisory boards by composing these boards of representatives of management,
unions, government, and various social groups. See Law 1385/1983. The boards would be
established on an industry-regional-wide level. Although this law was passed in Parliament, the
strong opposition of the employers and the relatively indifferent attitude of several unions prevented the law from actually being implemented. See generally MITROPOULOS, I ELLINIKI
EMPIRIA TON EPOPTICON SYMiVOULION (The Greek Experience With the Supervisory Boards)
1985 Synd. Epith. 8.
163. See Vagts, Reforming the "'Modern" Corporation"Perspectivesfrom the German,
80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 50-53 (1966) (illustrating the supervisory board's role in German
corporations).
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of workers on the boards of directors (the Swedish system).1 64 Since
the German and the Swedish systems of codetermination are the
most representative of the two forms of institutional codetermination, an examination of each, with an eye towards assessing the role
they can play in the decision making process when layoffs are contemplated by management, is in order.
In Germany, there are three systems of labor representation on
supervisory boards. The first and more liberal system governs the
steel and coal industries,"6 5 which have played a very important role
in the development of the F.R.G.. 66 The Codetermination Statute
concerning these industries was passed in 1951 and applies to joint
stock and limited liability companies with more than 1,000 employees. 167 The composition of the board is based upon the parity principle. The worker representatives are selected by the works councils,
the union that covers the company's employees and the German Federation of Labor (hereinafter "D.G.B."). 6 8 An independent person is
elected by the equally divided board, 169 and his vote breaks the
rarely occurring tie.1 70 The labor director, who is a member of the
managing board of the company, has extensive authority and will be
appointed by the supervisory board, unless this appointment is vetoed
by a majority of the workers' representatives on the board. 7
The second system of worker representation on the supervisory
boards in the F.R.G. is also based, theoretically, on the parity principle, and applies to companies with more than 2,000 employees in
industries other than coal and steel.172 The Codetermination Act of
May 4, 1976 was passed nowithstanding the fierce reactions of German employers and American multinationals with subsidiaries in the
164. See infra text accompanying notes 181-93.
165.

See supra note 158 and accompanying text.

166. T. DEVOS, supra note 90, at 140.
167. Waschke, supra note 108, at 94.
168.

J. CRISPO, supra note 60, at 84.

169. If the two parties do not agree on the selection of this person, then the ultimate
authority lies with the shareholders. However, as one commentator said, this has never occurred. See Waschke, supra note 108, at 94.
170. See Vagts, supra note 163, at 68. Cf Mueckenberger, Labor Law and Industrial
Relations, in ECONOMIC CRISIS, TRADE UNIONS AND THE STATE 252-53 (0. Jaccobi, B. Jessup, H. Kastendiek & M. Regini eds. 1986) [hereinafter ECONOMIC CRISIS] (stating that "[i]f
capital constantly had to resort to the power of the casting vote, the efficiency of the supervisory board as a functional organ of the company would be severely restricted.").
171. Hetzler & Schienstock, supra note 158, at 38.
172.

Waschke, supra note 108, at 95.
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F.R.G., 17 3 who among others, tried unsuccessfully to have it declared
unconstitutional by the German Federal Constitutional Court.17 4
This fierce reaction from the employers, who had by then
regained the social status that they had lacked when the act concerning the steel and coal industry was passed, 175 had some success. For
example, while the supervisory board is composed of an equal number of shareholders' and workers' representatives, the labor side includes managerial representatives who tended to identify with the
employer's side.17 6 This compilation, coupled with the tie breaking
vote of the chairman (who, in case of disagreement over his selection, is appointed by the shareholders), seriously undermines the parity principle. 177 Another employer accomplishment was that the labor director was to be appointed through the normal procedure of
voting in the supervisory8 board, thus eliminating the workers' repre17
sentatives' veto power.
The third system of representation in the F.R.G. applies to companies with less than 2,000 but more than 500 employees.17 9 According to the Works Constitution Act of 1972, the workers' representatives have one third of the seats on the board. 8 0
The Swedish system of participation on the companies' boards is
simpler from an American perspective. The companies have one
board and, according to the law passed in 1972 and reenacted in
1976,11 every company with more than 25 employees is required to

allow its workers to have two representatives on its board of directors182 which are to be appointed by the unions.
Conscious of the inherent limits that any scheme of
codetermination may have in a capitalist society, the unions did not
seek to achieve parity representation as in the F.R.G.. Instead, the
unions saw participation on corporate boards as a means of getting
173.

See T. DEVos, supra note 90, at 173-78.

174. Id. at 143-44, 178.
175.

See supra note 158.

176. See J. CRISPO, supra note 60, at 86.
177.
178.
179.

T. DEVOS, supra note 90, at 141.
Id.
Waschke, supra note 108, at 95.

180. In the mid-seventies, 0.6 million workers were covered by the law concerning the
steel and coal industry. Hetzler & Schienstock, supra note 158, at 41. Another 4.5 million
worked in companies covered by the 1976 Act and 9.3 million in firms affected by the 1972
Act, which applies the one-third participation scheme. Id.
181.

Its full name is the Act on Board Representation for Employees of Joint Stock

Companies and Cooperative Associations. Summers, Worker Participation,supra note 5, at
203 (citing F. SCHMIDT, LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SWEDEN 85).
182.

Elvander, supra note 115, at 147-48.
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both an inside view of the company's affairs and direct access to all
the information that they would need for bargaining with the employers.183 For them, minority representation was participation
enough to complement the bargaining process with their
companies.

It is not easy to comparatively assess the impact that
codetermination had upon decisions that, directly or otherwise, involved layoffs. It must be noted, however, that the Swedish system of
participation on corporate boards provides access to a body that has
much more authority and information than the supervisory board
has under German corporate law.185 The supervisory board does not
get involved in the everyday affairs of the business and thus, is in an
inferior position as to the managing directors. 186 That supervising director "understands relatively little about the affairs of the firm"'181
may have serious consequences upon the execution of his duties.
The percentage of workers' representatives on a corporate board
does not necessarily determine the amount of influence workers will
have upon the deliberations of the board.1 88 Real parity could make
a difference, but such a situation would create serious constitutional
problems in every capitalist country.189 Given the lack of parity, the
worker directors, being in the minority, will always have to depend
on their persuasiveness and not on their percentage of votes if they
want to acquire a majority on the board. This will be determined not
183.

See supra note 160.

184. See J. CRISPO, supra note 60, at 103 (saying that the Swedish unions favored minority board participation "as part of a totally integrated overall system of individual democ-

racy, including collective bargaining procedures and other forms of worker representation at
lower levels in the enterprise.").

185. Cf.Summers, An American Perspective of the German Model of Worker Participation, 8 COMP. LAB. L.J. 333, 339 (1987) (comparing German supervisory boards with Amer-

ican boards of directors, which have strong similarities with the Swedish boards, and finding
that directors on American boards have "significantly more information and influence than
...German directors because boards of directors in American corporations are single tier
with much greater role and control than supervisory boards in Germany.").
186. See also T. DEVos, supra note 90, at 173 (stating that "[i]t should be acknowledged, though, that most supervisory boards have been rubber stamping management decisions."); cf. Vagts, supra note 163, at 50, 53 (stating that "[t]he day to day conduct of business is in the hands of a managing board ('Vorstand')" (footnote ommitted) and that
"supervisory councils . . . have rarely made use of their statutory powers to discipline managing boards.").
187. Vagts, supra note 163, at 52.
188. Id. at 67-68 (stating that the decisions of the German supervisory boards are either

made unanimously or are divided across the lines).
189.

See T. DEVOs, supra note 90, at 144 (suggesting that the German Constitutional

Court's decision on the 1976 Act implies that if there were real parity constitutional problems
could arise).
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only by the strength of their arguments, but also by the general climate of labor relations in a particular country, exemplified by the
way that each side views the other and the expectations that unions
have of participation on the boards.
From this perspective, it is not surprising that union representatives have been more persuasive on German boards than on Swedish
ones. 90 Labor-management relations are more cooperative in the
F.R.G. than in Sweden, and the commitment of the Swedish unions
towards a longterm strategy of changing the social balance of power
is more evident than that of the German Federation of Labor.' 9l The
Swedish unions' expectations about codetermination are modest.' 912
Additionally, Sweden has had a much more troubled social and political climate since the early seventies.' 93 Thus, the workers' participation has had a greater effect in the actual running of the companies in Germany than in Sweden.
IV.

OTHER PROTECTIVE ASPECTS OF LABOR LAW

Research showing how other Western countries have dealt with
the issue of the workers' role in decisions leading to workforce reductions would be incomplete if other aspects of labor legislation, which
enhance the position of the workers and their representatives, were
not discussed.
Compared to the United States other countries give labor representatives enormous rights to bargaining information. The American
perception, that possession of information means power, makes the
employers unwilling to share much information about their companies, and the courts tend to tolerate this attitude.9 By contrast,
190. Compare T. DEVos, supra note 90, at 142-43 & J. CRISPO, supra note 60, at 88
(remarking on the effects of codetermination in F.R.G.) with Summers, Worker Participation,
supra note 5, at 213 (discussing co-determination in the context of Sweden).
191. An example of this trend is the long struggle of the Swedish labor-movement for
the enactment of the Meidner proposals that are supposed to transfer the companies' ownership to the workers. However, just at the peak of the unions' pressure for passage of this
radical measure, the Social-Democrats lost the 1976 elections. When they came back to power
they had lost much of their radicalism and thus, passed a very modest version of the initial
proposal. See Peterson, supra note 49, at 42. Contra Schregle, supra note 92, at 322-24 (stating that the German labor movement, despite the rhetoric that had followed the initial stages
of the codetermination reforms, has, during the last decade, lost a great degree of its ideological orientation).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 160-61.
193. Compare Peterson, supra note 49, at 32 (discussing the breaking down of the
'Swedish model') with Jaccobi, Trade Unions, Industrial Relations and Structural Economic
'Ruptures,' in ECONOMIC CRIsIs,-supra note 170, at 50, 52 (noting that the cooperative nature

of the German labor relations did not change in the crisis of the eighties).
194. See, e.g., Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB., 440 U.S. 301 (1979).
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other Western countries view information as a means of reality
based persuasion and thus, the sharing of information, either willingly as in Japan, or manditorily imposed by law as in most European countries, 195 is extensive. 19 8
Information may be acquired by the participation of the workers in the corporate boards, where, because of their position, the labor directors have access to any information concerning their companies. 19 This is rarely the case as almost all Western European
countries give extensive information rights either to the works councils or directly to the unions.1 98 Thus, in the F.R.G., the employer is
obligated to provide the ,vorks councils with detailed information
about the financial affairs of the company on his own initiative.1 99 In
firms with more than 100 employees a finance committee is established by the works councils and the employer must inform the committee "in full and good time of the financial affairs of the establishment" including matters such as investments and marketing poli20 0
cies.
In France, where relations are very confrontational, the socialist
government of Mitterand, attempted to promote more cooperative
industrial relations, by obligating the employer to provide the shop
committees with extensive information covering the financial and economic prospects of the company, reorganization plans, personnel
policies, etc.201

Generally, every country that has established works councils has
provided them with broad information rights to enable them to effectively fulfill their duties.20 2 Further, the tendency is to increase these
195. See Bellace & Gospel, Disclosureof Information to Trade Unions: A Comparative
Perspective, 122 INT'L LAB. REV. 57 (1983) (providing an interesting comparison of the American disclosure of information with the relevant statutes of the U.K. and Sweden).
196. Cf. Summers, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 11 at 154-55 (stating that
"[wihen employees are viewed as members of the enterprise and unions or works councils as
social partners in the enterprise, their right to full information . . . follows naturally...
Even in adversarial relations, the disclosure might be thought to lead to a more rational and
objective bargaining.").
197. Cf. Summers, Codeterminationin the United States: A Projectionof Problems and
Potentials,4 J. COMP. CORP. L. SEc. REG. 155, 165 (1982) (stating that "[p]robably the most
significant impact of codeterminatrion on collective bargining would be to provide the union
with information concerning the enterprise that it could use when developing its bargaining
policy").
198. See supra note 196.
199. Summers, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 11, at 153.
200. Id.
201. See C. TRAV. III art. L § 431.4 (referring to the French Labour Code).
202. Cf. C. TRAV. III art. L § 431.4 (referring to the French Labour Code).
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rights.2 0 3 Of course, this information ultimately goes to the unions
because most of the members of the councils are also union members.2" 4 Even in countries without a tradition of works councils the
law provides for extensive information rights for the unions. In Sweden the law requires the employer to keep the union "continuously
informed about how his activity is developing in respect to production and economically," 20 5 a phrase which has been liberally interpreted by the courts to cover a broad range of issues that would spoil
the sleep of many employers in the United States. 06 Finally, the
union has the right to inspect all of .the company's books to the extent needed in order to carry out its duties.207
As usual the U.K. is the exception. In the U.K. the duty to
disclose information is much narrower because of an exception in the
law designed to protect the employer. The employer may withhold
information if its disclosure would cause "substantial injury to the
employer's undertaking ' 2°s or if the information to be disclosed is
not of such a nature that without it "the union would be to a material extent impeded in bargaining."20 9 In considering this requirement, if one takes into account the fact that in the U.K., the employer is not obligated to bargain with a union, the limited effect
that the information requirement will have upon the employer 210 becomes apparent.
Finally, the problem of secrecy, present in all legal systems, is
usually dealt with by requiring the employees' representatives to
keep the information that they receive confidential. The U.S. and the
U.K. have preferred to give the employer the right to completely
withhold information that he considers confidential.2 1' It is not a co203. See, e.g., West Germany, Changes Planned to Works Constitution Act, 175 EUR.
INDUS. REL REV. 4 (Aug. 1988).
204. In F.R.G., for example, the councils' members that are supported by the German
Federation of Labor consist of about 65 percent of the total number of the councils' members
and this number is increasing in the eighties. See West Germany, Works Council Elections
1987, 169 EUR. INDUS. REL REV. 20, 21 (Feb. 1988).
205. Summers, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 11, at 153.
206. Cf. Bellace & Gospel, supra note 195, at 67-71.
207. Fahlbeck, The Swedish Act, supra note 128, at 156-59; see also Greece: New Collective Labour Law, 182 EUR. INDUS. REL REv.4 (March 1989)(discussing a recently proposed legislative reform which would give unions extensive information rights on issues like
investment programs, employment policies, financing of the company, price policies, etc.).
208. Docksey, supra note 138, at 290.
209. Summers, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 11, at 154.
210. Cf. Bellace & Gospel, supra note 195, at 66 (stating that "[b]ecause of the terms
of the Act, the way in which it has been interpreted, and the resultant decline of interest on
the part of unions in the use of the law, its direct influence has been slight.").
211. Summers, Comparative Perspectives. supra note 11, at 154.
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incidence that, under the influence of these two countries, the proposed E.E.C. directive dealing with the disclosure of information to
the workers' representatives, has been amended to allow the employer to withhold such information. 2
Besides collective labor law the substantial protection offered to
the workers by individual labor law (an area of law which up until
recently was almost unknown in the U.S.) merits discussion. Despite
some recent developments in the case and statutory law,213 this area
remains underdeveloped in comparison to other Western countries.
The recent changes in the law represent a long delayed recognition
of constitutional rights rather than any really innovative protection
arising under labor law.2 14

By contrast, the concept of employment-at-will has long ago
been abandoned by the other Western countries. 15 Even the U.K.,
with its tradition of antilabor common law, has passed substantial
legislation to enhance the individual worker's property rights in his
job. It is very characteristic that this protection was granted to the
workers without the major social and political controversies which
have taken place whenever collective labor law reforms have been
initiated. 1 This is an indication that, regardless of the predominant
political orientations of these societies, there is a general consensus
that the stakes of the individual worker in his job are indeed high
and that some protection must be offered. 1
The three chief means of protection offered to the individual
worker are: (1) advance-notice of his layoff; (2) the requirement of a
showing of some reason for the dismissal (or the possibility offered to
the employee to show the lack of such reason); and (3) redundancy
payments.
212. Interestingly enough, the language used in the directive is almost identical to the
British one. Article 7, paragraph I of the proposed directive allows the members of E.E.C. to
permit the employer to withhold information the disclosure of which "could substantially damage the undertaking's interests or lead to the failure of its plans." Docksey, supra note 138, at
290.
213. Lizner, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the
Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323 (1986); see, e.g., Summers, Labor
Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7 (1988).
214. These remarks do not aim to undermine the importance of these modest changes in
American labor law. They are made to show the distance between individual labor law in the
U.S. and laws of other western countries, which will be discussed later.
215.
216.

See Summers, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 11, at 141.
Raday, supra note 66, at 129 (stating that "the [p]rotection of individual job secur-

ity costs the employer little, while collective bargaining security requires the employer to bear
the far heavier burden of responsibility for economic change and mismanagement.").
217. See Bellace, supra note 33, at 416-17 (contrasting the European attitude to that of
the U.S.).
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All countries have provisions that require the employer to notify
employees of any planned layoff and this obligation is independent of
any notification requirement of the workers' representatives for the
purpose of consultation.""8 Thus, in the F.R.G., this period varies
from two weeks to three months for bluecollar workers and from six
weeks to six months for white-collar workers. 219 In the U.K., the period is from one to twelve weeks.120 Although most countries base
the length of the period on the length of the employee's past service,
the Swedish requirements are based upon the age of the dismissed
on the other hand, has a
worker, and can reach six months.2 21 Japan,222
fixed period of 30 days for advance notice.
In contrast, the United States was, until recently, the only major Western country with no advance-notice requirement imposed by
law. 2 3 In 1988 however, a law was passed by the Congress and reluctantly signed by President Reagan which provided for a twomonth period of advance-notice.224 Although this is a significant step
towards a more protective approach to the problem of layoffs, there
are considerable limitations in the law's application. First, the law
does not apply to all firms and to all kinds of situations where layoffs
occur.22 5 Second, there are other limitations to the application of the
law which, although they seem reasonable, carry with them the danger of abuse by the employers, an abuse tolerated by many friendly
courts. 22 Even this modest piece of legislation was passed over the
fierce reactions of employers and was initially vetoed by the Reagan
Administration (only to be approved because of the coming elections), z27 These limitations leave little hope that any further statu218. See Harrison, European and American Experience, in

DEINDUSTRIALIZATION,

supra note 36, at 260.
219. Bellace, supra note 33, at 439.
220. Id. at 435.
221. Summers, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 11, at 156.
222. Hanami, supra note 148, at 181.
223. Cf. Yoder & Staudohar, Management and Public Policy, in DEINDUSTRIALIZATION, supra note 36, at 196 (examining F.R.G., Sweden, France, Japan, Netherlands, Great
Britain and the U.S.).
224. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102
Stat. 890 (1988) (codified as 29 U.S.C. §2101 et. seq.).
225. The law does not apply to companies with more than 100 employees and only if
their management shuts down a plant with 50 full-time employees or layoffs one third of the
workers at a facility in a period of six months. See id. Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, § 2, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (codified as 29 U.S.C.
§2102).
226. See Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, §
4, 102 Stat, 890 (1988) (codified as 29 U.S.C. §2103).
227. See 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRFs. Docs. 990 (August 2, 1988) (providing President
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tory protection will be offered in the United States in the foreseeable
future.
As far as the justification for dismissal is concerned virtually all
Western countries have developed, either statutorily or judicially,
some protection for the worker. Most restrictions apply to the reasons for which a particular employee was selected to be laid off by
the employer.
In the F.R.G., the layoff must be "socially warranted" according to the Protection Against Dismissal Act.22 The courts tend to
adopt a balance of factors approach in this area, by taking. into account all the surrounding circumstances, needs and interests involved
in a particular dismissal.229 In France, the courts have long recognized the notion of "abuse of right," but the judges tend to defer to
the employer's judgment. 30 In the U.K., the concept of "unfair dismissal" exists which, although generally inapplicable to redundancies, applies to the criteria of selection of the particular employees to
be dismissed. 231 In Sweden, all dismissals must be for cause and the
relevant statute gives some guidelines to the courts as to what should
not be considered "for cause. '232 If the decision is challenged in the
Swedish courts, the employee is entitled to remain on the rolls until
the decision has been awarded.233 Finally, in Japan the courts have,
on the basis of the constitutionally protected right to work, developed
the concept of "just cause" as a requirement for dismissal and they
consider it as part of the "public order."234 However, they seem to
limit their scrutiny to the selection of laid-off workers, and not to the
economic reasons for the dismissals themselves.235
Reagan's statements at the time of the Bill's enactment); see also Susser, Election-yearPolitics and the Enactment of Federal "Plant closing" Legislation, 14 EMP. L.J. 849 (1988).
228. Bellace, supra note 33, at 439.
229. See Weiss, IndustrialEmployment Rights, supra note 102, at 86-89 (providing an
analysis of the concept of social justification of a dismissal).
230. The concept of "abus de droit" was first applied by the French Supreme Court in
1926 and was enacted into law in 1928. Comment, Employment at Will, the French Experience as a Basis for Reform, 9 CoMp. LAB. L.J. 294, 299 (1988). An act passed in 1973 required that the dismissal be for genuine and serious cause. Id. at 303. Although the "traditional trend in France seems to favor a restricted application of the concept of unjust cause"
the employees are still better off than in the U.S.. Id. at 308. It had to be noted that this
problem is basically offered only for noneconomic dismissals.
231. Bellace, supra note 33, at 436 n.106.
232. Neal, The Employment Protection Act and Individual Employment Law in Sweden, in LAw AND THE WEAKER PARTY, supra note 128, at 182.
233. Id.
234. T. Hanami, supra note 149, at 85.
235. It must be remembered here that a certain portion of the Japanese labor force is
protected against layoffs by the long established practice of life-employment. According to this
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Most of the industrialized countries have statutory provisions
for redundancy payments. In the U.K., a lump sum payment, based
on the worker's age, length of past service and previous weekly pay
(up to one and a half week's pay for each year of service for people
over the age of forty), is provided. 36 In the F.R.G., while there is no
statutory specification of the compensation to be paid, the employer
is required by law to formulate with his works councils a plan for the
protection of the dismissed workers,2 37 and these plans generally provide generous compensation. 38 In France, apart from the compensation provided upon dismissal (whether caused by economic reasons
or by reasons related to the worker himself), there is a provision for
periodic allowances for up to one year after the dismissal.239 In Italy,
the statute provides for compensation of the white-collar workers
only and it is one month's wage for every year of service. 40 Virtually
all countries have similar provisions established by law and furthered
by collective agreements.
These differences between the individual labor law of the U.S.
and the other Western countries have immense consequences in the
field of collective bargaining. Unions, which in the U.S. are the only
representatives of the employees, are at a clear disadvantage as compared with their counterparts in other industrial countries because
they have to fight for the fundamental and elementary protection
that is elsewehere provided by law. 241 The workers in other countries
have a minimum of protection from which they can start their collective action, American unions must start from almost zero protection for the jobs of their members.242
Many American unions, which have considerable power and enthe
dedicated support of their members, have been able to secure
joy
substantial protection for their individual members. But if one looks
at the content of these provisions, he will soon realize that they are
policy, once a worker has been hired by a firm he is to remain there for his entire working life.
However, the percentage of the workforce under such a status is no more than 25 percent. See
Anthony, supra note 32, at 98.
236. Bellace, supra note 33, at 436.

237. See supra text accompanying notes 91-99.
238.

See Summers, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 11, at 156.

239.

Pelissier, France, in

UNDERTAKINGS,

supra note 148, at 73-75.

240. Treu, Italy, in UNDERTAKINGS, supra note 148, at 157-58.

241.

Cf. Kare, Workplace Democracy, supra note 10, at 65 (stating that "[i]f just

cause were recognized as a basic civil right

. . .

collective bargaining about job security and

discipline would start with just cause as the floor and build upwards. . . .Employees would
not have to expend bargaining chips to get elementary just cause protections.").
242. Cf. Bok, supra note 8, at 1423 (stating that "[m]ost of the protections afforded by
social legislation in Europe were left to be won [in the U.S.] at the bargaining table.").
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far behind the protection offered in other Western countries. 243
Though they have achieved some protection, this has not been done
without a certain cost. The bargaining process is one of give and
take. To achieve through collective bargaining what other countries'
workers enjoy because of the law, they had to forego other tasks and
thus lose something in comparison with their foreign homologues. 2 "
Thus, the decision to leave the protection of the individual workers to the process of collective bargaining should not be considered a
neutral one where the State plays the role of Pontius Pilate. It is a
political choice between the interests of the employers and those of
the employees, and heavily impedes the unions' ability to effectively
carry out their functions as agents of collective bargaining. 2 "
V. A

GENERAL ASSESSMENT

Although countries other than the U.S. have been far more innovative in promoting industrial relations through broadening the
channels of communication between the two parties, there are legitimate objections that can be raised as to whether what we have discussed so far, proves that the workers in other countries play a
broader role in making decisions that reduce a company's work
force.
The most obvious objection is that the actual reality in these
countries might be quite different from the image that the law creates.246 Indeed, in several countries there is evidence that the rights
actually accorded to the workers by law are less extensive than they
appear to be in theory.247
In countries such as the U.K., where the courts are an outspo243.

See Raday, supra note 66, at 128; see also Bok, supra note 8, at 1418.

244. Cf. Raday, supra note 66, at 124 (stating that "[j]ob security has been purchased
by unions in a market which gives no such initial right."). (emphasis added).
245. Klare, Workplace Democracy, supra note 10, at 63 (stating that "[t]he at-will doctrine is 'neutral on the side of the empoloyer.' ").
246. American reality offers a lot of examples as to this point. One such example was
the recent strike at Eastern Airlines. It is well settled law that under the Railway Labor Act
(hereinafter "R.L.A.") which governs the airlines, sympathy strikes are legal. See Burlington
Northern R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance Employees, 481 U.S. 429 (1987). However, this
weapon could not be used effectively by the striking I.A.M. union because of the hostility of
the American public toward sympathy strikes and the threat of the Administration that it
would change the law to prohibit sympathy strikes even under R.L.A.. Thus, the labor movement could not use a right which exists in the books.

247. See, e.g., Bellace & Gospel, supra note 195, at 73 (stating that "[l]egal rights
alone are of little use in the absence of favourable attitudes and institutions."). This comment
was made after comparing the information disclosure requirements in the U.S., the U.K. and
Sweden.
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ken enemy of organized labor,248 laws passed by the Parliament in
favor of labor are seriously limited in the courtrooms. Thus, one
must read an English law, and see its interpretation by the courts
before drawing any conclusions about the position of the workers and
the unions in that country.
Even more important is the fact that in periods of economic recession, workers' rights created in prosperous years are seriously
damaged because of the constant threat of unemployment. The unions lose their effectiveness and the governments (even the left-wing
ones) are forced to implement policies which take back what was
previously "given.''249 France's experience is very characteristic: the
pressures of the eighties' economic crisis forced both the government
and the unions to adopt the policy of "flexibilite" in industrial relations, which allows individual companies to make collective agreements with lesser protection for the workers than that provided by
central agreements. 50 This policy overturned a long standing principle of industrial relations in France that was established under more
conservative governments. 25 ' Adverse economic conditions forced
even Japan, a country where attitudes do not change easily, to reconsider the notion of lifetime employment and the general concept that
workers should be laid off only in extreme circumstances. 52
Furthermore, public opinion towards workers' rights plays a vital role in how the statutes are implemented. For example, British
unions have a very broad right to strike to support their collective
bargaining efforts. However, anyone familiar with the public's attitude towards unions in the late seventies 253 knows that the effectiveness of the strike weapon can be seriously hampered by the public's
indifference or even hostility towards strikes. British unions paid very
248. See Clark & Wedderburn, Modern Labour Law: Problems, Functions, and Policies, in LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: BUILDING ON KAHN FREUND 165,
171(Lord Wedderburn, R. Lewis & J. Clark eds. 1983); E. DAVIDSON, THE JUDICIARY AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW (1984) (providing an interesting survey of the attitude of English judges towards labor and labor relations).
249. For the moderation of the labor policies of social-democratic governments, see
Clark & Wedderburn, supra note 248, at 194-95 (regarding the U.K.); Hooks, supra note 37,
at 256 (regarding France); Peterson, supra note 49, at 41 (regarding Sweden).
250. Comment, The American Model Unrealized: A Reevaluation of Plant Bargaining
in France, 10 Comp. LAB. L.J. 196, 202-03 (1989); see also France-Reform of Redundancy
Procedures, 150 EUR. INDUS. REL. REV. 9 (July 1986).
251. This principle is still valid in most western European countries.
252. Cf. Anthony, supra note 32, at 125.
253. British unions faced their lowest popularity in the post-war period in 1979. See
Edwards & Bain, Why are Trade Unions Becoming More Popular? Unions and Public Opinion in Britain, 26 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 311, 313 (1988).
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dearly for their neglect of their people's feelings 254 when during the
stormy strikes of the winter of 1979 the voters decidedly turned
against the Labour Party and the national trade union, T.U.C., at
that time.
Most of these limitations on the workers' rights often do not
appear in the statutes and are difficult for a foreign observer to detect. However, they must be taken account when considering the collective rights of the workers over layoffs.
The differences between the workers' rights in the U.S. and the
rest of the Western world are clear. All the above mentioned negative factors for unions are also present in the United States. Courts
are increasingly turning hostile towards labor, the adverse economic
circumstances of the eighties hit the labor movement in America 2l
(to a greater extent than in the other countries), and as for public
opinion, it is hard to find any country with less antiunion feelings
than the U.S..256
The minimal role offered to the American workers and unions
over layoff decisions is due in part to the role of law itself. Law is, of
course, but only one of the, factors that determine the balance of
powers between various social groups, but it is certainly an important one. Every choice made on a legislative level has its impact
upon the relative power of the groups in a given society and, in a
society where there is an obvious imbalance of social power between
employers and labor, abstention is a choice reproducing this inequal17
ity.25
If the social struggle between groups with differing interests
looks like a race, the law determines the points from which each
party will start the race. While the strength of the parties does much
to determine the outcome of the race, the initiating points also play a
considerable role.
Some of the most commonly held misperceptions in the United
States about other countries' labor systems and the extensive protection"they offer to the workers are a serious obstacle to any attempt to
suggest that the American labor system should look for alternatives
254.
Eco NoMIc
255.
256.

Crouch, Conservative IndustrialRelations Policy: Towards Labour Exclusion?, in
CRISIS, supra note 170, at 148.
See generally Hooks, supra note 37, at 244.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.

257. In any case, American labor law can hardly be characterized as abstentionist. The
severe restrictions on the right to strike and to bargain over certain issues demonstrate the onesided interventionist approach of the law, at least as interpreted by the courts. See Summers,
The Usefulness of Unions, supra note 125, at 1440 (stating that "[t]he law is nominally neutral but effectively hostile to developing a comprehensive system such as exists in other

countries.").
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to provide satisfactory solutions to the problems that it presently
faces. It is inaccurate to attribute the broad role that organized labor
enjoys in other Western countries, regarding managerial decisions
involving work force reductions, to the cooperational attitudes of the
two parties in these countries and thus say that such a role would not
work in the U.S.. If cooperation is indeed prevalent in the F.R.G.
and Japan, this is not the case in France, the U.K., nor to some
extent, in Sweden2 58 (at least during the last fifteen years). Although
unions in most European countries are quite aggressive and have
deep convictions against the capitalist system and the capital owners,259 this did not prevent legislation from granting them several
property rights in their jobs. To the contrary, the unions' aggressiveness might have been one of the primary reasons for such legislation.
Cooperational attitudes may account for the existence of institutionalized forms of labor participation, such as works councils and
representation on the corporate boards, but not for the process of
collective bargaining where the lines are clearly drawn between the
two parties. 260 From a political point of view, American unions are
much more integrated into the capitalist system than any other unions in the Western world. 26' Rather than justifying the limited protection offered to American workers by the alleged aggressiveness of
the unions, it would be more accurate to attribute this lack of protection to the integration of the labor movement. One is tempted to
assume that the less threatening the latter is, the less need there is to
give some rights to the workers to appease the unions.
Also inaccurate is the belief that the role provided for the workers in these countries is a mere reflection of a general interventionist
approach on the part of their governments. This approach has political overtones not shared by the mainstream of American politics.
Even though most of the legislation was passed by social democratic
governments, it did survive the arrival of Conservative parties into
258. See supra notes 89-111, and accompanying text.
259. See T. DEVOS, supra note 124, at 189 (stating that "a considerable segment of
British unionists have a lot [more] in common with their French and Italian peers than with
their northern European peers. . .British workers feel a far greater degree of alienation from
and distrust for management than is found in most other northern European countries.").
As for the French unions, it is characteristic that two of the three major national unions,
C.F.D.T. and C.G.T., have strong political and ideological ties with the socialist and the communist parties respectively. A. CAREW, supra note 44, at 24-25.

260. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
261.

See St. Antoine, Prevention of Antiunion Discrimination in The United States, 9

CoMP. LAB. L.J. 384, 398 (1988) (stating that "[o]urs is the most conservative, least ideological of all labor movements, traditionally committed to the capitalistic system.").
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power, 62 and this is a strong indication that it is not partisan politics
that an attempt is involved in such legislation. 63 It is also the realization that to ,bring some balance between the two parties in labor
relations by assisting the weaker one, while not threatening the
whole political system that conservatives are eager to preserve,
presents many socioeconomic advantages.
Finally, the traditional hostility that employers in the U.S. distheir certain reaction to any future legisplay towards unions, 264 and thi
lative attempt towards an increase of the workers' role in collective
dismissals, should not discourage such an attempt, to the extent that
it will be found beneficial. It would be wrong to assume that legislation of workers' collective rights in Europe was easy to pass. The
employers' reactions were enormous and it required high pressure
from the unions and strong political will by several governments to
pass the laws.2"5
Thus, we see that there is nothing unique in the American system which isolates it from any idea of increasing the workers' rights
in their jobs. Rather, the uniqueness lies in the adamant refusal of
the employers' political allies in Congress and the White House to
even discuss similar legislative reforms and in the inability of unions
to effectively press them to this direction. Realizing that this adamant refusal exists will be the first step in the direction of reconsidering the duty to bargain over layoffs, as it has developed in this
country, and finding solutions that will promote the interests of the
262.

Thus, the conservative government, which took power in 1982 in F.R.G., did not

change the labor legislation of the social-democrats. See Mueckenberger, supra note 170, at
240.

In Britain, the situation was different since the Thatcher government made several steps
in the direction of limiting the effectiveness of previous labor legislation. See Resistance, supra
note 113, at 446 (1989). However, after 10 years of such attack on labor legislation by a
government whose popularity remains largely strong, the fact that British legislation still offers
more protection regarding the duty to bargain over massive dismissals than American law,
serves to underline the differences between the position in Europe and the United States on
labor.

263.

Cf. Klare, Workplace Democracy, supra note 10, at 38 (stating that "[s]ince the

World War II, many of our trade rivals have viewed social welfare policy as, at least to some

extent, an investment in protecting and upgrading human capital."); Raday, supra note 66, at
134 (regarding "political pragmatism").
264. Summers, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 11, at 142.
265. See Bok, supra note 8, at 1419.
There has been sharp opposition in almost every country at some stage in the evolu-

tion of social legislation -and this opposition has been expressed by the same groups
using much the same arguments as in the United States. As a result, the critical
question is why these attitudes still persist so strongly in America and why they
have not been countered as effectively as in most other countries.
Id. (emphasis in the text).
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workers in their jobs, and the quality of the job done in the American workplace.
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